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ABSTRACT
eGeneral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was introduced in
Europe to oer new rights and protections to people concerning
their personal data. We investigate GDPR from a database sys-
tems perspective, translating its legal articles into a set of capabil-
ities and characteristics that compliant systems must support. Our
analysis reveals the phenomenon of metadata explosion, wherein
large quantities of metadata needs to be stored along with the per-
sonal data to satisfy the GDPR requirements. Our analysis also
helps us identify the new workloads that must be supported un-
der GDPR. We design and implement an open-source benchmark
called GDPRbench that consists of workloads and metrics needed
to understand and assess personal-data processing database sys-
tems. To gauge how ready the modern database systems are for
GDPR, we modify Redis and PostgreSQL to be GDPR compliant.
Our evaluations show that this modication degrades their perfor-
mance by up to 5×. Our results also demonstrate that the current
database systems are two to four orders of magnitude worse in
supporting GDPR workloads compared to traditional workloads
(such as YCSB), and also do not scale as the volume of personal
data increases. We discuss the real-world implications of these
ndings, and identify research challenges towards making GDPR
compliance ecient in production environments. We release all of
our soware artifacts and datasets at hp://www.gdprbench.org
1. INTRODUCTION
“Measure what is measurable, and make
measurable what is not so.”
Galileo Galilei
eEuropean Union enacted the General Data Protection Regu-
lation (GDPR) [36] on May 25th 2018 to counter widespread abuse
of personal data. While monetizing personal data at scale has ex-
isted since the early dot-com days, a systemic disregard for the pri-
vacy and protection of personal data is a recent phenomenon. For
example, in 2017, Uber secretly paid o [26] hackers to delete the
stolen personal data; Yahoo! confessed [31] that three years ago,
a the had exposed all 3 billion of its user records; Facebook ad-
mied [41] that their APIs allowed illegal harvesting of user data,
which in turn inuenced the U.S. and U.K. democratic processes.
GDPRrights and responsibilities. To deter such practices, GDPR
declares the privacy and protection of personal data as a funda-
mental right of all European people. It grants several new rights
to the EU consumers including the right to access, right to recti-
cation, right to be forgoen, right to object, and right to data
portability. GDPR also assigns responsibilities to companies that
collect and process personal data. ese include seeking explicit
consent before using personal data, notifying data breaches within
72 hours of discovery, maintaining records of processing activities,
etc.. Failing to comply with GDPR could result in hey penalties:
up to €20M or 4% of global revenue, whichever higher. For in-
stance, in January 2019, Google was ned €50M for lacking cus-
tomer consent in their ads personalization [37]; in July 2019, British
Airways was ned £184M for failing to safeguard personal data of
their customers [33].
GDPR compliance is challenging. Compliance with GDPR is
challenging for several reasons. First, GDPR’s interpretation of
personal data is broad as it includes any information that relates
to a natural person, even if it did not uniquely identify that per-
son. For example, search terms sent to Google are covered under
GDPR. is vastly increases the scope of data that comes under
GDPR purview. Second, several GDPR regulations are intention-
ally vague in their technical specication to accommodate future
advancements in technologies. is causes confusion among de-
velopers of GDPR-compliant systems. Finally, several GDPR re-
quirements are fundamentally at odds with the design principles
and operating practices of modern computing systems [40]. It is
no surprise that recent estimates [8, 23] peg the compliance rate
to be less than y percent.
Analyzing GDPR. In this work, we aim to understand, achieve,
and benchmark GDPR compliance of database systems. We ana-
lyze GDPR and distill its articles into capabilities and character-
istics that database systems must support. In doing so, we make
strict interpretation of GDPR regulations. For example, GDPR does
not specify how soon aer a Right To Be Forgoen request should
the data be erased. We resolve this ambiguity by requiring the
data to be deleted synchronously in real-time. In contrast, Google
cloud, which claims GDPR compliance, informs that all deletions
will complete within 180 days of request [4]. We believe that an-
alyzing the impact of and benchmarking the overheads of a strict
interpretation is a useful reference point for designers and prac-
titioners. However, in practice, a company may adapt a relaxed
interpretation that reduces the cost and overhead of compliance.
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We make three key observations in our analysis.
1. We identify and characterize the phenomenon ofmetadata ex-
plosion, whereby every personal data item is associated with
up to sevenmetadata properties (like its purpose, time-to-live,
objections etc) that govern its behavior. By elevating each
personal data item into an active entity that has its own set
of rules, GDPR mandates that it could no longer be used as a
fungible commodity. is is signicant from a database stand-
point as it severely impacts both the control- and data-path
operations of datastores.
2. We observe that GDPR’s goal of data protection by design and
by default conicts with the traditional system design goals
of optimizing for performance, cost, and reliability. For ex-
ample, in order to notify people aected by data breaches, a
company may want to keep an audit trail of all accesses to
their personal data. From a datastore perspective, this turns
every read operation into a read followed by a write.
3. Lastly, we identify that GDPR allows new forms of interac-
tions with datastores. We discuss the characteristics of these
GDPR queries, and their implications for database systems.
GDPRbench. As our analysis reveals, GDPR signicantly aects
the design and operation of datastores that hold personal data.
However, none of the existing benchmarks recognize the abstrac-
tion of personal data: its characteristics, storage restrictions, or
interfacing requirements. We design and implement GDPRbench,
a new open-source benchmark that represents the functionalities
of a datastore deployed by a company that collects and processes
personal data. e design of GDPRbench is informed by painstak-
ing analysis of the legal cases arising from GDPR from its rst
year of roll-out. GDPRbench is composed of four core workloads:
Controller, Customer, Processor, and Regulator ; these core work-
loads are not captured by any database benchmark available to-
day. GDPRbench captures three benchmarking metrics for each
workload: correctness, completion time, and space overhead.
EvaluatingGDPR-CompliantDBMS. Finally, to gauge how ready
the modern database systems are for GDPR, we take two widely-
used, open-source database systems, Redis [10] (an in-memory
NoSQL store) and PostgreSQL [9] (a relational DBMS), and mod-
ify them to be GDPR-compliant. We followed recommendations
from the developers of these tools [12, 9] in making them GDPR-
compliant; the goal was to make minimal changes, not to redesign
the systems for GDPR compliance. While both systems are able
to achieve GDPR compliance with a small amount of eort, the
resulting systems experienced a performance slow down of 5×
and 2× respectively. We evaluated the performance of GDPR-
compliant Redis and PostgreSQL using GDPRbench. We observed
that both systems were operating at a throughput that is two to
ve orders of magnitude lower than that of the traditional work-
loads. Our analyses and experiments identify several implications
for administering GDPR-compliant database systems in the real
world.
Limitations. Our eorts at introducing GDPR compliance in Re-
dis and PostgreSQL are guided by the current best practices. We
realize that resulting performance degradation could be further re-
duced with GDPR specic optimizations and redesigning security
mechanisms. It is not the focus of this work. Next, the design
of GDPRbench is guided by several factors including (i) our in-
terpretation of GDPR, (ii) court rulings and GDPR usecases in the
real-world, and (iii) the two database systems that we investigated.
As such, we recognize that the current iteration of GDPRbench is
a snapshot in time, and may need to evolve as more technical and
legal use cases emerge.
Summary of contributions. Our work lays the foundation for
understanding and benchmarking the impact of GDPR on database
systems. In particular, we make the following contributions:
• GDPR Analysis: Our work is the one of the rst to explore
GDPR from a database systems perspective. We analyze the
articles of GDPR, both individually and collectively, to dis-
till them into aributes and actions for database systems. In
doing so, we (i) observe the phenomenon of metadata explo-
sion, and (ii) identify the new workloads that personal data
systems must support.
• Design and Implementation of GDPRbench: To enable
customers, companies and regulators interpret GDPR com-
pliance in a rigorous and systematic way, we design an open-
source GDPR centric benchmark. In GDPRbench, we model
the queries and workloads that datastores encounter in the
real-world, and develop metrics to succintly represent their
behavior. We make all our soware artifacts publicly avail-
able at hp://www.gdprbench.org.
• Experimental Evaluation:We discuss our eort into trans-
forming Redis and PostgreSQL to be GDPR-compliant. Our
evaluation shows that due to GDPR compliance, Redis experi-
ences a performance degradation of 5×, and PostgreSQL, 2×.
Using GDPRbench, we show the completion time and storage
space overhead of these compliant systems against real-world
GDPR workloads. Finally, we share our insights on deploying
compliant systems in production environments, implications
of scaling personal data, as well as research challenges to-
wards making GDPR compliance, fast and ecient.
2. BACKGROUND
Webeginwith a primer onGDPR including its internal structure
and its adoption challenges in the real world. en, we discuss
related work to set a context for our contributions.
2.1 GDPR Overview
e European parliament adopted GDPR on April 14th 2016,
and made it an enforceable law in all its member states starting
May 25th 2018. Its objective is to set ground rules for processing
personal data such that its commoditization does not conict with
the rights and protection of the people.
GDPR is wrien1 as 99 articles that describe its legal require-
ments, and 173 recitals that provide additional context and clari-
cations to these articles. e articles (henceforth prexed with G )
could be grouped into ve broad categories. G 1-11 articles layout
the denitions and principles of personal data processing; G 12-23
establish the rights of the people; then G 24-50 mandate the re-
sponsibilities of the data controllers and processors; the next 26
describe the role and tasks of supervisory authorities; and the re-
mainder of them cover liabilities, penalties and specic situations.
We expand on the three categories that concern systems storing
personal data.
Principles of data processing. GDPR establishes several core
principles governing personal data. For example, G 5 requires that
data collection be for a specic purpose, be limited to what is
necessary, stored only for a well dened duration, and protected
against loss and destruction. G 6 denes the lawful basis for pro-
cessing, while G 7 describes the role of consent.
1even the CS people in our team found it quite readable!
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Rights of data subjects. GDPR grants 12 explicit and excercis-
able rights to every data subject (a natural person whose personal
data is collected). ese rights are designed to keep people in loop
throughout the lifecycle of their personal data. At the time of col-
lection, people have the right to know the specic purpose and
exact duration for which their data would be used (G 13, 14). At
any point, people can access their data (G 15), rectify errors (G 16),
request erasure (G 17), download or port their data to a third-party
(G 20), object to it being used for certain purposes (G 21), and -
nally, withdraw from automated decision-making (G 22). In the
rest of the paper, we use the terms, data subjects and customers,
synonymously.
Responsibilities of data controllers. e third group of articles
outline the responsibilities of data controllers (entities that collect
and utilize personal data) and data processors (entities that process
personal data on behalf of a controller). To clarify, when Netix
runs their recommendation algorithm on Amazon’s MapReduce
platform, Netix is the controller and Amazon, the processor. Key
responsibilities include designing secure infrastructure (G 24, 25),
maintaining records of processing (G 30), notifying data breaches
within 72 hours (G 33, 34), analyzing risks prior to processing large
amounts of personal data (G 35, 36) and controlling the location of
data (G 44). Additionally, the controllers should create interfaces
for people to exercise their GDPR rights.
2.2 GDPR from a Database Perspective
GDPR denes four entities—controller, customer, processor, and
regulator—that interact with the data store. Figure–1 shows how
three distinct types of data ows between the GDPR entities and
data stores. e database that hosts personal data and its associ-
ated metadata (purpose, objections etc.,) is the focus of our work.
We distinguish it from the other store that contains non-GDPR
and derived data as the rules of GDPR do not apply to them.
e controller is responsible for collection and timely deletion
of personal data as well as managing its GDPR metadata through-
out the lifecycle. e customers interact with the data store to
exercise their GDPR rights. e processor uses the stored per-
sonal data to generate derived data and intelligence, which in turn
powers the controller’s businesses and services. Finally, the reg-
ulators interact with the datastores to investigate complaints and
to ensure that rights and responsibilities are complied with.
Our focus on datastores is motivated by the high proportion of
GDPR articles that concern them. From out of the 99 GDPR arti-
cles, 31 govern the behavior of data storage systems. In contrast,
only 11 describe requirements from compute and network infras-
tructure. is should not be surprising given that GDPR is more
focused on the control-plane aspects of personal data (like col-
lecting, securing, storing, moving, sharing, deleting etc.,) than the
actual processing of it.
2.3 GDPR in the Wild
e rst year of GDPR has demonstrated both the need for and
challenges of a comprehensive privacy law. On one hand, peo-
ple have been exercising their newfound rights like the ability to
download all the personal data that companies have amassed on
them [18], and not been shy to report any shortcomings. In fact,
the EU data protection board reports [16] 94622 complaints from
individuals and organizations in the rst 9 months of GDPR.
However, any aempt to regulate decade-long practices of com-
moditizing personal data is not without consequences. A number
of companies like Instapaper, Klout, and Unroll.me voluntarily ter-
minated their services in Europe to avoid the hassles of compli-
ance. Like wise, most of the programmatic ad exchanges [20] of
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Figure 1: GDPR denes four roles and distinguishes between three
types of data. Only the datastore that contains personal and GDPR
metadata comes under the GDPR purview. e arrows out of a data-
store indicate read-only access, while the arrows into it modify it. (1)
e controller can collect, store, delete and update any personal- and
GDPR-metadata, (2) A customer can read, update, or delete any per-
sonal data and GDPR-metadata that concerns them, (3) A processor
reads personal data and produces derived data, and (4) Regulators
access GDPR metadata to investigate customer complaints.
Europe were forced to shut down. is was triggered by Google
and Facebook restricting access to their platforms to those ad ex-
changes that could not verify the legality of the personal data they
possessed. But, several organizations could comply by making mi-
nor modications to their business models. For example, media
siteUSA Today turned o all advertisements [42], whereas the New
York Times stopped serving personalized ads [21].
As G 28 precludes employing any data processor that does not
comply with GDPR, the cloud providers have been swi in show-
casing [49, 48, 35] their compliance. However, given the mone-
tary and technical challenges in redesigning the existing systems,
the focus has unfortunately shied to reactive security. It is still
an open question if services like Amazon Macie [5], which em-
ploys machine learning to automatically discover, monitor, and
alert misuse of personal data on behalf of legacy cloud applica-
tions would survive the GDPR scrutiny.
Regulators have been active and vigilant as well: the number
of ongoing and completed investigations in the rst 9 months of
GDPR is reported to be 206326. Regulators have already levied
penalties on several companies including €50M on Google [37] for
lacking a legal basis for their ads personalization, and £184M on
British Airways [33] for lacking security of processing. However,
the clearest sign of GDPR’s eectiveness is in the fact that regula-
tors have received 64684 voluntary data breach notications from
companies in the rst ninemonths of GDPR. In contrast, that num-
ber was 945 for the six months prior to GDPR [43].
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3. DESIGNING FOR COMPLIANCE
We analyze the articles of GDPR, both individually and collec-
tively, from a database system perspective. e goal of this section
is to distill our analysis into aributes and actions that correspond
to database systems. We identify three overarching themes: how
personal data is to be represented, how personal data is to be pro-
tected, and what interfaces need to be designed for personal data.
ese three collectively determine how GDPR impacts database
systems.
3.1 Characterizing Personal Data
GDPR denes personal data to be any information concerning
a natural person. As such, it includes both personally identiable
information like credit card numbers as well as information that
may not be unique to a person, say search terms sent to Google.
is signicantly increases the proportion of data that comes un-
der GDPR purview. Also, by not restricting the applicability of
GDPR to any particular domain like health and education as in
the case of HIPAA [2] and FERPA [1] respectively, GDPR brings
in virtually all industries under its foray.
Next, to govern the lifecycle of personal data, GDPR introduces
several behavioral characteristics associated with it; we call these
GDPR metadata. is constitutes a big departure from the evo-
lution of data processing systems, which have typically viewed
data as a helper resource that could be fungibly used by soware
programs to achieve their goals. We discover that, when taken
collectively, these metadata aributes convert personal data from
an inert entity to a dynamic entity that possesses its own purpose,
objections, time-to-live etc., such that it can no longer be used as a
fungible commodity. Below, we list the seven metadata aributes
that must be stored along with every piece of personal data.
1. Purpose. G 5(1b) states that personal data should only be col-
lected for specic and explicit purposes, and not further pro-
cessed in a manner incompatible with those purposes. Also,
the recent Google case [37] has established that GDPR explic-
itly prohibits any purpose bundling.
2. Time to live. Given the value of personal data, the long-
standing practice in computing has been to preserve them in-
denitely (or at least till they are economically viable). How-
ever, G 5(1e) mandates that personal data shall be kept for no
longer than necessary for the purposes for which it was col-
lected. In addition, G 13(2a) requires the controller to provide
this TTL value to the customer at the time of data collection.
3. Objections. G 21 grants users a right to object, at any time, to
any personal data being used for any purposes. is right is
broadly construed, and a controller has to demonstrate com-
pelling legitimate grounds to override it. is property, es-
sentially sets up a blacklist for every personal data item.
4. Audit trail. G 30 requires controllers and processors to main-
tain records of their processing activities. en, G 33(3a) re-
quires that in the event of a data breach, the controller shall
report the approximate number of customers and their per-
sonal data records aected. In light of these requirements,
cloud providers including Amazon [6] have started support-
ing ne-grained per-item access monitoring. is would cre-
ate an audit trail for every personal data item.
5. Origin and sharing. Every personal data item should have
an origin i.e., how it was originally procured, and sharing in-
formation i.e., external entities with which it has been shared
(G 13, 14). e data trail set up by these articles should enable
customers to track their personal data in secondary markets.
6. Automated decision-making. is concerns the emerging
use of algorithmic decision-making. G 15(1) grants customers
a right to seek information on which of their personal data
was used in automated decision-making. Conversely, G 22 al-
lows them to request that their personal data be not used for
automated decision-making.
7. Associated person. G 15 enables users to ask for all the per-
sonal data that concern them along with all the associated
GDPR metadata. As such, it is imperative to store the identi-
cation of the person to whom it concerns.
Impact on Database System Design. We call our observation
that every personal data item should be associated with a set of
GDPR metadata properties as metadata explosion. is has signif-
icant consequences in both control- and data-path operations of
database systems. First, having to store metadata along with the
data increases the overall storage space. Second, having to val-
idate each access (for purpose etc.,) and having to update aer
each access (for audit etc.,), increases the access latency for per-
sonal data. ough it may be possible to optimize—for example, by
reusing some metadata across records, and by caching reads—the
overheads cannot be reduced to trivial.
3.2 Protecting Personal Data
GDPR declares (in G 24) that those who collect and process per-
sonal data are solely responsible for its privacy and protection.
us, it not onlymandates the controllers and processors to proac-
tively implement security measures, but also imposes the burden
of proving compliance (in G 5(2)) on them. Based on our analysis
of GDPR, we identify ve security-centric features that must be
supported in the database system.
1. Timely Deletion. In addition to G 5(1e) that requires every
personal data item to have an expiry date, G 17 grants cus-
tomers the right to request erasure of their personal data at
any time. us, datastores must have mechanisms to allow
timely deletion of possibly large amounts of data.
2. Monitoring and Logging. As per G 30 and G 33(3a), the
database system needs to monitor its operations in both data
path (i.e., read or write) and control path (say, changes to ac-
cess control), so that compliance can be established upon re-
quest by a regulator, or relevant information be shared with
regulators and customers in the event of data breaches.
3. Indexing via Metadata. Ability to access groups of data
based on one or more metadata elds is essential. For ex-
ample, controllers needing to modify access control (G 25(2))
against a given customer’s data; G 28(3c) allowing processors
to access only those personal data for which they have req-
uisite access and valid purpose; G 15-18, 20-22 granting cus-
tomers the right to act on their personal data in a collective
manner (deleting, porting, downloading etc.,); nally, G 31 al-
lowing regulators to seek access to metadata belonging to af-
fected customers.
4. Encryption. G 32 requires controllers to implement encryp-
tion on personal data, both at rest and in transit. While pseudo-
nymization may help reduce the scope and size of data need-
ing encryption, it is still required of the datastore.
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No GDPR article/clause What they regulate Impact on database systems
Aributes Actions
5 Purpose limitation Collect data for explicit purposes Purpose Metadata indexing
5 Storage limitation Do not store data indenitely TTL Timely deletion
13
14 Information to be provided […]
Inform customers about all the GDPR
metadata associated with their data
Purpose, TTL,
Origin, Sharing Metadata indexing
15 Right of access by users Allow customers to access all their data Person id Metadata indexing
17 Right to be forgotten Allow customers to erasure their data TTL Timely deletion
21 Right to object Do not use data for any objected reasons Objections Metadata indexing
22 Automated individual decision-making Allow customers to withdraw fromfully algorithmic decision-making
Automated
decisions Metadata indexing
25 Data protection by design and default Safeguard and restrict access to data — Access control
28 Processor Do not grant unlimited access to data — Access control
30 Records of processing activity Audit all operations on personal data Audit trail Monitor and log
32 Security of processing Implement appropriate data security — Encryption
33 Notification of personal data breach Share audit trails from aected systems Audit trail Monitor and log
Table 1: e table maps the requirements of key GDPR articles into database system aributes and actions. is provides a blueprint for
designing new database systems as well as retroing the current systems into GDPR compliance.
5. Access Control. G 25(2) calls on the controller to ensure that
by default, personal data are not made accessible to an indef-
inite number of entities. So, to limit access to personal data
based on established purposes, for permied entities, and for
a predened duration of time, the datastore needs an access
control that is ne-grained and dynamic.
Impact on Database System Design. GDPR’s goal of data pro-
tection by design and by default sits at odd with the traditional
system design goals of optimizing for cost, performance, and reli-
ability. While our analysis identied a set of just ve security fea-
tures, we note that modern database systems have not evolved to
support these features eciently. us, a fully-compliant database
system would likely experience signicant performance degrada-
tion.
3.3 Interfacing with Personal Data
GDPR denes four distinct entities—controller, customer, pro-
cessor, and regulator—that interface with the database systems
(shown in Figure 1). en, its articles collectively describe the
control- and data-path operations that each of these entities are
allowed to perform on the database system. We refer to this set of
operations asGDPR queries, and group them into seven categories:
• CREATE-RECORD to allow controllers to insert a record con-
taining personal data with its associated metadata (G 24).
• DELETE-RECORD-BY-{KEY|PUR|TTL|USR} to allow cus-
tomers to request erasure of a particular record (G 17); to al-
low controllers to delete records corresponding to a completed
purpose (G 5.1b), to purge expired records (G 5.1e), and to clean
up all records of a particular customer.
• READ-DATA-BY-{KEY|PUR|USR|OBJ|DEC} to allow pro-
cessors to access individual data items or those matching a
given purpose (G 28); to let customers extract all their data
(G 20); to allow processors to get data that do not object to spe-
cic usage (G 21.3) or to automated decision-making (G 22).
• READ-METADATA-BY-{KEY|USR|SHR} to allow customers
to nd out metadata associated with their data (G 15); to assist
regulators to perform user-specic investigations, and inves-
tigations into third-party sharing (G 13.1).
• UPDATE-DATA-BY-KEY to allow customers to rectify in-
accuracies in personal data (G 16).
• UPDATE-METADATA-BY-{KEY|PUR|USR} to allow cus-
tomers to change their objections (G 18.1) or alter previous
consents (G 7.3); to allow processors to register the use of given
personal data for automated decision making (G 22.3); to en-
able controllers to update access lists and third-party sharing
information for groups of data (G 13.3).
• GET-SYSTEM-{LOGS|FEATURES} to enable regulators to
investigate system logs based on time ranges (G 33, 34), and to
identify supported security capabilities (G 24,25).
Impact on Database System Design. When taken in totality,
GDPR queries may resemble traditional workload, but it would be
remiss to ignore two signicant dierences: (i) there is a heavy
skew of metadata-based operations, and (ii) there is a need to en-
force restrictions on who could perform which operations under
what conditions. ese observations make it impractical to store
GDPRmetadata away from the personal data (say, on backup stor-
age to savemoney), which in turnmay aect system optimizations
like caching and prefetching (since the results, and even the ability
to execute a query are conditional on several metadata factors).
3.4 Summary
Table–1 summarizes our analysis of GDPR. We identify three
signicant changes needed to achieve GDPR compliance: ability to
handle metadata explosion, ability to protect data by design and by
default, and ability to support GDPR queries. While it is clear that
these changes will aect the design and operation of all contem-
porary database systems, we lack systematic approaches to gauge
the magnitude of changes required and its associated performance
impact. Towards solving these challenges, we design GDPRbench,
a functional benchmark for GDPR-compliant database systems (in
Section-4), and present a case study of retroing two popular
databases into GDPR compliance (in Section-6).
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4. GDPRBENCH
GDPRbench is an open-source benchmark to assess the GDPR
compliance of database systems. It aims to provide quantiable
ground truth concerning correctness and performance under GDPR.
In the rest of this section, we motivate the need for GDPRbench,
and then present its design and implementation.
4.1 Why (a New) Benchmark?
As our analysis in Section-3 reveals, GDPR signicantly aects
the design and operation of datastores that hold personal data.
However, existing benchmarks like TPC and YCSB do not rec-
ognize the abstraction of personal data: its characteristics, stor-
age restrictions, or interfacing requirements. is is particularly
troublesome given the diversity of stakeholders and their conict-
ing interests. For example, companies may prefer a minimal com-
pliance that avoids legal troubles without incurring much perfor-
mance overhead or modications to their systems. On the other
hand, customers may want to see a strict compliance that priori-
tizes their privacy rights over technological and business concerns
of controllers. Finally, regulators need to arbitrate this customer-
controller tussle in a fast-evolving technologyworld. us, having
objective means of quantifying GDPR compliance is essential.
A rigorous framework would allow system designers to com-
pare and contrast the GDPR implications of their design choices, as
well as enable service providers to beer calibrate their oerings.
For example, many cloud providers currently report the GDPR
compliance of their services in a coarse yes-no format [6], making
it dicult for regulators and customers to assess either the com-
pliance levels or performance impact. Finally, many governments
around the world are actively draing privacy regulations. For in-
stance, India’s ongoing Personal Data Protection bill [14], and Cal-
ifornia’a proposed Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) [3]. is bench-
mark provides a methodical way to study the ecacy of GDPR
regulations, and then adopt suitable parts of this law.
4.2 Benchmark Design
Our approach to benchmark design is guided by two factors:
insights from our GDPR analysis, and real-world data from the
rst year of GDPR roll out. At a high level, GDPRbenchmodels the
working of a database deployed by an organization that collects
and processes personal data. Below, we describe the key elements
of the benchmark design.
4.2.1 Data Records
Given the stringent requirements of GDPR, it is prudent to as-
sume that personal data would be stored separately from other
types of data. us, our benchmark exclusively focuses on per-
sonal data records. Each record takes the form <Key><Data>
<Metadata>, where <Key> is a variable length unique iden-
tier, <Data> is a variable length personal data, and <Meta-
data> is a sequence of seven aributes, each of which has a three
leer aribute name followed by a variable length list of aribute
values. We enforce all the elds of the record to have ASCII char-
acters (except for semicolon and comma, which we use as separa-
tors). We illustrate this with an example record:
ph-1x4b;123-456-7890;PUR=ads,2fa;TTL=365days;
USR=neo;OBJ=∅;DEC=∅;SHR=∅;SRC=first-party;
Here, ph-1x4b is the unique key and 123-456-7890 is
the personal data. Following these two, we have seven aributes
namely purpose (PUR), time-to-live (TTL), user (USR), objections
(OBJ), automated decisions (DEC), third-party sharing (SHR), and
originating source (SRC). Some aributes have a single value, some
have a list of values, and a few others have ∅.
4.2.2 Workloads
We dene four workloads that correspond to the four core en-
tities of GDPR: controller, customer, processor and regulator. We
compose the workloads using the queries outlined in Section-3.3,
and concerning only the ow of personal data and its associated
metadata (denoted in Figure–1 by thick and doed lines respec-
tively). en, we glean over usage paerns and traces from the
real-world to accurately calibrate the proportion of these queries
and the distribution of the data records they act on. However, since
GDPR is just a year old, the availability of said data in the public
domain is somewhat limited. us, for those situation where no
real data is available, we make reasonable assumptions in compos-
ing the workloads. e resulting GDPRbench workloads are sum-
merized in Table–2, and described in detail below. While GDPRbench
runs these workloads in its default conguration, we make it pos-
sible to update or replace themwith customworkloads, when nec-
essary.
Controller. e controller workload consists of three categories
of operations: (i) creation of records, (ii) timely deletion of records,
and (iii) updates to GDPRmetadata towards managing access con-
trol, categorization, third-party sharing, and locationmanagement.
While the controller is also responsible for the security and relia-
bility of the underlying storage system, we expect these to be in-
frequent, non real-time operations and thus, do not include them
in our queries.
To determine the frequency and distribution of operations, we
rely on three GDPR properties: rst, in a steady state, the number
of records createdmustmatch the number of records deleted (since
G 5.1 mandates that all personal data must have an expiry date);
next, a valid sequence of operation for each record should always
be create, updates, and delete in that order; lastly, the controller
queries should follow a uniform distribution (since G 5.1c prevents
the controller from collecting any data that are not necessary or
useful). We set the update queries to occur twice as frequently as
creates and deletes.
Customer.isworkload represents the key rights that customers
exercise while interfacing with the database system: (i) the right
to delete any of their data, (ii) the right to extract and port all their
data, (iii) the right to rectify their personal data, and nally (iv) the
right to access and update the metadata associated with a given
personal data.
To determine the frequency and distribution of customer queries,
we study operational traces fromGoogle’s implementation of Right-
to-be-Forgoen (RTBF) [15] in Europe. ough GDPR has a name-
sake article (G 17), RTBF is a distinct 2014 EU ruling that allowed
individuals to request the search engines to delist URLs that con-
tain inaccurate, irrelevant and excessively personal information
from their search results. We gather three high-level takeaways
from the Google report: rst, they received 2.4 million requests
over a span of three years at a relatively stable average of 45k
monthly requests. Second, 84.5% of all delisting requests came
from individual users. Finally, the requests showed a heavy skew
towards a small number of users (top 0.25% users generated 20.8%
delisting). Based on these insights, we compose our customerwork-
load by assigning equal weights to all query types and conguring
their record selections to follow a Zipf distribution.
Regulator. e role of the regulator is to investigate and enforce
the GDPR laws. In case of data breaches or systematic compliance
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Figure 2: GDPRbench core workloads (a), and its architecture (b). e table describes the high-level purpose of each workload along with its
composite queries and their default parameters. We select these defaults based on GDPR properties, data from EU regulators, and usage paerns
from industry. e architecture diagram shows the components of YCSB that we reused in gray and our GDPR-specic extensions in blue.
violations, the regulator would summon access to detailed system
logs for the period of interest. In case of privacy rights violation of
individual customers, they would seek access to the GDPR meta-
data associatedwith that particular customer. However, regulators
do not need access to any personal data.
To calibrate the regulator workload, we inspect the European
Data Protection Board’s summary [16] of the rst 9 months of
GDPR roll out. It reports that the supervisory authorities received
206326 complaints EU-wide. Out of these, 94622 (46%) were di-
rect customer complaints concerning their privacy rights, 64684
(31%) were voluntary data breach notications from controllers,
and the rest (23%) were statutory inquiries against multinational
companies, and complaints by non-government and civil rights
organizations. We set the weights of regulator queries to match
the percentages from this report. Next, in line with the Google
RTBF experience, we expect the rights violations and compliance
complaints to follow a Zipf distribution.
Processor. e processor, working on behalf of a controller, per-
forms a well-dened set of operations on personal data belong-
ing to that controller. While this role is commonly external, say a
cloud provider, the law also allows controllers to be processors for
themselves. In either case, the processor workload is restricted to
read operations on personal data.
We compose the processor workload to reect both existing and
emerging access paerns. For the former, we refer to the ve
representative cloud application workloads identied by YCSB, as
shown in Table–2. While some operations (like updates and in-
serts) are not permied for processors, their access paerns and
record distributions are still relevant. For the emerging category,
we rely on our GDPR analysis, which identies access paerns
conditioned on metadata aributes like purpose and objection.
Since this is still an emerging category, we limit its weight to 20%.
4.2.3 Benchmark Metrics
We identify three metrics that provide a foundational charac-
terization of a database’s GDPR compliance: correctness against
GDPR workloads, time taken to respond to GDPR queries, and the
storage space overhead.
Correctness. We dene correctness as the percentage of query
responses that match the results expected by the benchmark. is
number is computed cumulatively across all the four workloads. It
is important to note that correctness as dened by GDPRbench is a
necessary but not sucient condition for the database to be GDPR
compliant. is is because GDPR compliance includes multitude
of issues including data security, breach notication, prior consul-
tation and others that cover the whole lifecycle of personal data.
However, the goal of this metric is to provide a basic validation
for a database’s ability to store and process metadata-based access
control.
Completion time. is metric measures the time taken to com-
plete all the GDPR queries, and we report it separately for each
workload. For majority of GDPR workloads, completion time is
more relevant than the traditional metrics like latency. is is be-
cause GDPR operations embody the rights and responsibilities of
the involved actors, and thus, their utility is reliant upon com-
pleting the operation (and not merely starting them). is is also
reective of the real world, where completion time gets reported
more prominently than any other metric. For e.g., Google cloud
guarantees that any request to delete a customer’s personal data
would be completed within 180 days.
Space overhead. It is impossible for a database to comply with
the regulations of GDPR without storing large volumes of meta-
data associated with personal data (a phenomenon described in
Section-3.1 as metadata explosion). Since the quantity of meta-
data overshadows that of personal data, it is an important metric
to track. GDPRbench reports this metric as the ratio of total size of
the database to the total size of personal data in it. us, by deni-
tion, it will always be a rational number >1. As a metric, storage
space overhead is complementary to completion time since opti-
mizing for one will likely worsen the other. For example, database
applications can reduce the storage space overhead by normaliz-
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ing the metadata. However, this will increase the completion time
of GDPR queries by requiring access to multiple tables.
4.3 Implementation
We implement GDPRbench by adapting and extending YCSB.
is choice was driven by two factors. First, YCSB is an open-
source benchmark with a modular design, making it easy to reuse
its components and build new ones on top of it. Second, it is amod-
ern benchmark (released in 2010) and has a widespread commu-
nity adoption with support for 30+ storage and database systems.
In the following, we describe the architecture and operations of
GDPRbench.
Figure–2b shows the core infrastructure components of YCSB
(in gray), and our modications and extensions (in blue). Along-
side the core workloads of YCSB, we create new GDPR workloads
that describe operations and their proportions for GDPR roles (as
in Table–2). Inside the YCSB core infrastructure, we modify the
workload engine to parse GDPR queries and translate them to
corresponding storage operations. Note that we reuse the YCSB
runtime engine that manages threads and statistics. Finally, the
storage interface layer consists of client stubs (one per database
system) that translates the generic operations into specic APIs
supported by a given storage/database system. Since GDPR in-
troduces many new operations that are not natively supported by
most database systems (for example, seing TTL for a record, or
operations based on metadata), we had to implement new client
stubs for all database systems. us far, we have added support
for Redis and PostgreSQL, but our goal is to extend this to most
major database systems. We have added or modied ∼1300 LoC
in the workload engine, and ∼ 400 LoC for Redis and PostgreSQL
clients.
5. GDPR-COMPLIANT DBMS
Our goal is to present a case study of retroing current gener-
ation systems to operate in a GDPR world. Accordingly, we select
two widely used open-source systems: Redis [10], an in-memory
NoSQL store, and PostgreSQL [9], a fully featured RDBMS. Our ef-
fort to transform Redis and PostgreSQL into GDPR compliance is
largely guided by the recommendations in their ocial blogs [12,
9], and other experiences from real-world deployments. While
we intend to introduce GDPR compliance into more database sys-
tems, and integrate them with GDPRbench, we picked Redis and
PostgreSQL as our initial choices as they represent distinct design
philosophies, and thus provides a level of generality for our nd-
ings. In the following, we describe our code and conguration
changes to these two systems, and present microbenchmark mea-
surements.
5.1 Redis
From amongst the features outlined in Section-3, Redis fully
supports monitoring; partially supports timely deletion and meta-
data indexing; but oers no native support for encryption and ac-
cess control. In lieu of natively extending Redis’ limited security
model, we incorporate third-party modules for encryption. For
data at rest, we use the Linux Unied Key Setup (LUKS) [7], and
for data in transit, we set up transport layer security (TLS) us-
ing Stunnel [11]. We defer access control to DBMS applications,
and in our case, we extend the Redis client in GDPRbench to en-
force metadata-based access rights. Next, while Redis oers sev-
eral mechanisms to generate audit logs, we determine that piggy-
backing on append-only-le (AOF) results in the least overhead.
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Figure 3: Microbenchmarks: (a) Redis’ delay in erasing the expired
keys beyond their TTL. Our modied TTL algorithm in the GDPR-
compliant Redis erases all the expired keys within sub-second latency.
(b) PostgreSQL’s performance worsens signicantly as secondary in-
dices are introduced.
However, since AOF only records the operations that modify Re-
dis’ state, we update its internal logic to log all interactions includ-
ing reads and scans.
Finally, though Redis oers TTL natively, it suers from inde-
terminism as it is implemented via a lazy probabilistic algorithm:
once every 100ms, it samples 20 random keys from the set of keys
with expire ag set; if any of these twenty have expired, they are
actively deleted; if less than 5 keys got deleted, then wait till the
next iteration, else repeat the loop immediately. us, as percent-
age of keys with associated expire increases, the probability of
their timely deletion decreases. To quantify this delay in erasure,
we populate Redis with keys having expiry times. e time-to-live
values are set up such that 20% of the keys will expire in short-
term (5 minutes) and 80% in the long-term (5 days). Figure– 3a
then shows the time Redis took to completely erase the short-term
keys aer 5 minutes have elapsed. As expected, the time to era-
sure increases with the database size. For example, when there are
128k keys, clean up of expired keys (∼25k of them) took nearly 3
hours. To support a stricter compliance, we modify Redis to iter-
ate through the entire list of keys with associated EXPIRE. en,
we re-run the same experiment to verify that all the expired keys
are erased within sub-second latency for sizes of up to 1 million
keys.
5.2 PostgreSQL
As a feature-rich RDBMS, PostgreSQL oers native support to
four of the ve GDPR features, with the exception of Timely dele-
tion. For encryption, we set up LUKS and SSL (in verify-CAmode).
For logging, in addition to the built-in csvlog, we set up a row-level
security policy to record query responses. Next, we create meta-
data indexing via the built-in secondary indices. As with Redis,
we enforce metadata-based access control in the external client of
GDPRbench. Finally, since PostgreSQL does not oer native sup-
port for time-based expiry of rows, wemodify theINSERT queries
to include the expiry timestamp and then implement a daemon
that checks for expired rows periodically (currently set to 1 sec).
To eciently support GDPR queries, an administrator would
likely congure secondary indices for GDPR metadata. Interest-
ingly, while PostgreSQL natively supports secondary indices, we
observe that its performance begins to drop signcantly when the
number of such indices increases as shown in Figure–3b. Using
the built-in pgbench tool, we measure throughput on the Y-axis,
and the number of secondary indices created on the X-axis. We
run this pgbench experiment with a DB size of 15GB, a scale fac-
tor of 1000, and with 32 clients. Just introducing two secondary
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Figure 4: Performance overhead of introducing new GDPR features in Redis and PostgreSQL. Our evaluation using YCSB shows that Redis
experiences signicantly higher ovehead (5×) compared to PostgreSQL (up to 2×).
indices, for the widely used metadata criteria of purpose and user-
id, reduces PostgreSQL’s throughput to 33% of the original.
Key Takeaways. Introducing GDPR compliance in Redis and Post-
greSQL was not an arduous task: Redis needed 120 lines of code
changes, and Postgres about 30 lines of scripting. We accomplished
all of ourmodications, conguration changes, andmicrobenchmark-
ing in about a person-month. However, as our microbenchmarks on
TTL and secondary indices show, even for supported GDPR features,
administrators should carefully analyze the impact on their DBMS
deployments.
6. EVALUATION
We evaluate the impact of GDPR on database systems by an-
swering the following questions:
• What is the overhead of GDPR features on traditional work-
loads? (in Section-6.1)
• How do compliant database systems perform against GDPR
workloads? (in Section-6.2)
• How does the scale of personal data impact performance? (in
Section-6.3)
Approach. To answer these questions, we use the GDPR compli-
ant versions of Redis and PostgreSQL described in section-5. Next,
to quantify the performance overhead of GDPR features on tradi-
tional workloads, we use the industry standard Yahoo Cloud Serv-
ing Benchmark [19]. Finally, using GDPRbench, we determine the
state-of-the-art performance levels of our GDPR-compliant Redis
and PostgreSQL against realistic GDPR workloads.
Experimental setup.Weperform all our experiments onChame-
leon cloud [28]. e database systems are run on a dedicated Dell
PowerEdge FC430 with 40-core Intel Xeon 2.3GHz processor, 64
GB RAM, and 400GB Intel DC-series SSD. We choose Redis v5.0
(released March 18, 2019), PostgreSQL v9.5.16 (released Feb 14,
2019), and YCSB 0.15.0 (released Aug 14, 2018) as our reference
versions.
6.1 Overheads of Compliance
e goal of this experiment is to quantify the performance over-
head of introducing GDPR compliance. To do so, we use the indus-
try standard YCSB [19]. As shown in Table–2, YCSB comprises of
6 workloads that represent dierent application paerns. For this
experiment, we run YCSB with 16 threads; congure it load 2M
records and perform 2M operations in each workload category.
Redis. Figure 4a shows the YCSB workloads on the X-axis and
Redis’ throughput on the Y-axis for each of the newly introduced
Workload Operation Application
Load 100% Insert Bulk DB insert
A 50/50% Read/Update Session store
B 95/5% Read/Update Photo tagging
C 100% Read User prole cache
D 95/5% Read/Insert User status update
E 95/5% Scan/Insert readed conversation
F 100% Read-Modify-Write User activity record
Table 2: YCSB workload paerns
GDPR security features. We normalize all the values to a baseline
version of Redis that has no security. First, we see that encryption
reduces the throughput by ∼10%, and our modication towards
achieving timely deletion brings it down by∼20%. Next, we setup
Redis to log all its operations via the AoF mechanism (not syn-
chronously in real-time, but in batches synchronized once every
second), and see the throughput drops by ∼70%. Finally, when all
these features are enabled in tandem, Redis experiences a slow-
down of 80%.
PostgreSQL. Similar to Redis, wemeasure the throughput of Post-
greSQL when congured with dierent security features in Fig-
ure 4b. First o, we see that the eect of GDPR on PostgreSQL
is not as pronounced as in the case of Redis. is is largely at-
tributable to Redis’sminimalist securitymodel aswell as the single-
threaded design. PostgreSQL experiences 10-20% degradation due
to encryption and TTL checks, while logging incurs a 30-40% over-
head. When all features are enabled in conjunction, PostgreSQL
slows down to 50-60% of its baseline performance.
Summary. While the performance drop is not surprising in itself
since the introduced security measures aect all of the read/write
operations, it is the magnitude of the overhead (5× for Redis and
∼2× for PostgreSQL) that makes GDPR compliance debilitating for
production environments.
6.2 GDPRWorkloads
While the previous section demonstrated the performance over-
head due to GDPR security features, the goal of this section is to
quantify how the compliant versions of Redis and PostgreSQL per-
form against real-world GDPR workloads. To do so, we congure
GDPRbench to load 100K personal records, and perform 10K op-
erations for each of its four workloads. We use the default propor-
tion of workload queries and record distributions as specied in
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Figure 5: Running GDPRbench workloads on compliant versions of Redis and PostgreSQL. We see that PostgreSQL is not only an order of
magnitude faster than Redis in the baseline congruation, its performance could be further improved by enabling metadata indexing.
Personal data
size (MB)
Total DB
size (MB)
Space
factor
Redis 10 35 3.5×
PostgreSQL 10 35 3.5×
PostgreSQL w/
metadata indices 10 59.5 5.95×
Table 3: Storage space overhead corresponding to Figure-5. In de-
fault conguration, GDPRbench has 25 bytes of metadata aributes
for a 10 byte personal data record. Our evaluation indicates that in-
troducing secondary indices for all the metadata elds increases the
storage space overhead from 3.5× to 5.95×.
Table–2, and run it with 8 threads. Note how the number of oper-
ations is two orders of magnitude lower than in the YCSB cong-
uration. is shows the challenges of supporting GDPR queries.
Redis. Figure–5a shows Redis’ completion time along Y-axis, and
the GDPRbench workloads along the X-axis. As expected, the pro-
cessor workload runs the fastest given its heavy skew towards
non-metadata based operations. In comparison, all other work-
loads are 2-4× slower, with the controller workload taking the
longest. Table–3 benchmarks the metadata explosion. In the de-
fault conguation, we see a space overhead ratio of 3.5 i.e., for
every byte of personal data inserted, the storage system size in-
creases by 3.5 bytes. Unfortunately, since Redis lacks the support
for multiple secondary indices, we do not show any further opti-
mizations.
PostgreSQL. Next, Figure–5b shows the corresponding baseline
compliance graph for PostgreSQL. Right away, we see that the
completion times are an order of magnitude faster than Redis for
all the workloads. Our proling indicates that PostgreSQL, being
an RDBMS, is beer at supporting complex queries eciently, on
top of implementing GDPR security features with much less over-
head (as discussed in section–6.1).
Finally, given the outsized impact of metadata based quries in
GDPRbench, we congure PostgreSQL with secondary indices for
all metadata. Figure–5c then shows how this improves PostgreSQL’s
baseline compliance performance. Expectedly, the completion time
improves for all the workloads, though the scale of improvement
is more pronounced for controller workload. is is primarily be-
cause the gain in speed by having secondary indices is annulled
to an extent by the overhead of maintaining several secondary in-
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Figure 6: Representative throughput achieved by Redis and Post-
greSQL on YCSB and GDPRbench, under identical conditions. Both
systems perform 2-4 orders of magnitude worse for GDPR workloads
as opposed to traditional workloads.
dices. However, adding these extra indices increase the storage
space overhead from 3.5× to 5.95× as outlined in Table–3.
GDPR vs. traditional workloads. In Figure–6, we compare how
Redis and PostgreSQL perform under identical conditions of hard-
ware, soware, and conguration against two workloads: YCSB
and GDPRbench. For traditional workloads represented by YCSB,
both Redis and PostgreSQL achieve throughputs in the range of
10000 operations per second. In contrast, GDPR workloads sign-
ciantly degrade their performance: by 2-3 orders of magnitude for
PostgreSQL, and by 4 orders of magnitude for Redis.
Summary. GDPRbench reects the challenges of supporting GDPR
specic workloads on retroed compliant systems. While both Re-
dis and PostgreSQL suer from orders of magnitude degradation in
their performance compared to traditional workloads, our evaluation
shows that feature-rich RDBMS like PostgreSQL performs beer than
NoSQL stores like Redis.
6.3 Effect of Scale
Finally, we explore how an increase in the scale of data aects
the systems. In particular, we structure this experiment to reect a
scenario where a company acquires new customers, thus increas-
ing the volume of data in the DB. However, the data of the ex-
isting customers remain unchanged. is experiment then mea-
sures how Redis and PostgreSQL perform for queries concerning
the orignal set of customers. We lay out experiments in two dier-
ent contexts: rst, when the database contains non-personal data,
we run YCSB workloads; second, when the database contains per-
sonal data, we use GDPRbench customer workload. In both cases,
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Figure 7: Time taken by Redis to complete 10K operations as the
volume of data stored in the DB increases. For the traditional work-
load in (a), Redis’ performance is only governed by the number of
operations, and thus remains virtually constant across 3 orders of
magnitude change in DB size. However, for GDPR workload in (b),
the completion time linearly increases with the DB size.
we scale the volume of data within the database but perform the
same number of operations at every scale. For both GDPR and tra-
ditional workloads, we use identical underlying hardware, same
version of GDPR-compliant Redis and PostgreSQL soware, and
retain the same conguration as in section–6.1.
Redis. For Redis, we populate 100K records and perform 10K op-
erations. First, Figure-7a shows Redis’ completion time for YCSB
workload C. We see that Redis takes almost identical time to com-
plete 10K (read) operations, despite increasing the database vol-
ume by 3 orders of magnitude. is is not unexpected as Redis
supports ecient, constant-time CRUD operations.
However, when we switch from traditional workloads to GDPR
workload, Figure-7b paints a dierent picture. In this graph, we
linearly increase the volume of personal data from 100K to 500K
records, and we see a corresponding linear increase in the com-
pletion time. is indicates that the completion time is not only
a function of the number of operations but also the size of the
database. In hindsight, this is not completely unexpected as meta-
data based queries require O(n) access, especially in absense of
secondary indices.
PostgreSQL. Finally, we conduct the same scale experiment on
PostgreSQL (metadata-index version). While PostgreSQL’s per-
formance for YCSB (shown in Figure-8a) is expectedly similar to
that of Redis, its response to GDPR workload (shown in Figure-8b)
is much beer than that of Redis. While PostgreSQL is still aected
by the increase in DB size, the impact on its performance is muted.
Our proling indicates that this is largely due to secondary indices
speeding up metadata based queries. But as the DB size increases,
the overhead of maintaining multiple secondary indices does in-
troduce some performance degradation.
Summary. Current generation database systems do not scale well
for GDPR workloads. While PostgreSQL with metadata indexing
fares beer than Redis, neither of them exhibit a scale response that
make them production ready, especially in environments with large
amounts of personal data.
7. DISCUSSION
Our experiments and analyses identify several implications for
administeringGDPR-compliant database systems in the real world,
as well as research challenges emerging from it. We discuss them
below.
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Figure 8: Time taken by PostgreSQL to complete 10K operations as
the DB size scales. Expectedly, PostgreSQL’s performance reamins
constant for traditional workloads in (a). However, unlike in Redis
(Figure-7a), PostgreSQL’s GDPR performance worsens only moder-
ately thanks to its use of metadata indices.
7.1 Real-world Implications
Compliancemay results in highperformance overheads. Our
work demonstrates that while it is straight-forward to retrot Re-
dis and PostgreSQL into GDPR compliance, the resulting perfor-
mance degradation of 2-5× (in section-6.1) raises fundamental ques-
tions of compliance-eciency tradeos. Database engineers and
adminstrators should carefully analyze the performance implica-
tions of any compliance eorts, especially in production environ-
ments. For instance, recommendations from cloud providers such
as Amazon Web Services [49], Microso Azure [35], and Google
Cloud [48] primarily focus on checklist of security features with-
out much aention to their performance implications.
Compliant systems experience challenges at scale. A key
takeaway from our scale experiments (in section-6.3) is that naive
eorts at achieving GDPR compliance results in poor scalability.
Increasing the volume of personal data, even by modest amounts,
makes it challenging to respond to customer’s GDPR rights in a
timely manner, or even to comply with GDPR responsibilities in
real-time. us, consideration for scale ought to be an important
factor in any compliance eort.
Additionally, GDPR quells the notion that personal data, once
collected, is largely immutable. In light of GDPR’s right to be for-
goen and right to rectication, customers are allowed to exercise
much greater control over their personal data. Consequently, tra-
ditional solutions to scale problems like replication and sharding
would likely incur extra overheads than before. It might be worth
investigating the benets of a GDPR co-processor.
Compliance is easier in RDBMS than NoSQL.We observe that
achieving compliance is simpler and eective with RDBMSs than
NoSQL stores. In our case, Redis needed two changes at the in-
ternal design level as opposed to PostgreSQL, which only needed
conguration changes and external scripting. Even from a perfor-
mance point of view, the drop is steeper in high-performant Redis
as compared to PostgreSQL. We hope our ndings encourage de-
signers and maintainers of all categories of database systems to
reevaluate their design choices, optimization goals, and deploy-
ment scenarios in the light of privacy regulations like GDPR.
GDPR is strict in principle yet exible in practice. ough
GDPR is clear in its high-level goals, it is intentionally vague in its
technical specications. Consider G 17 that requires controllers
to erase personal data upon request by the customer. It does not
specify how soon aer the request should the data be removed. Let
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us consider its implications in the real world: Google cloud, which
claims GDPR-compliance, describes the deletion of customer data
as an iterative process [4] that could take up to 180 days to fully
complete.
Such exibility is not unique to the time of completion. Con-
sider G 30 that requires processors to keep an audit trail of interac-
tions with personal data. e regulation does not specify if the log
data should be stored in a persistent media, or how oen should
it be updated, or how easily should it be accessible. Similarly, G 32
requires controllers to implement pseudonymization and encryp-
tion without specifying any particular algorithms or techniques
for either. us, having compliance as a spectrum instead of xed
targets, allows database engineers and administrators to explore
the tradeo between strict compliance vs. high performance.
7.2 Research Challenges
Our evaluations show that trivially extending the existingmech-
anisms and policies to achieve compliance would result in signif-
icant performance overheads. We observe two common sources
of this: (i) retroing new features when they do not align with
the core design principles. For example, adding to Redis’ minimal-
ist security model, and (ii) using features in ways that are not in-
tended by their designers. For example, enabling continuous log-
ging or multiple secondary indices in production environments.
We identify three key challenges that must be addressed to achieve
compliance eciently: ecient auditing, ecient time-based dele-
tion, and ecient metadata indexing.
Another key tussle in the design space is whether to build com-
pliance at the level of individual infrastructure components (i.e.,
compute servers, and database systems) versus implementing end-
to-end compliance of given regulations (i.e., implementing right-
of-access in a music streaming service). Both these directions will
result in dierent performance tradeos and give rise to dier-
ent system interfaces. e former approach makes the eort more
contained and thus, suits the cloud model beer (where GDPR ex-
plicitly prohibits selling products and services that do not comply
with its regulations). e laer approach provides opportunities
for cross-layer optimizations (e.g., avoiding access control in mul-
tiple layers).
8. RELATEDWORK
A preliminary version of this analysis appeared [39] in a work-
shop. To the best of our knowledge, this work is one of the rst
to analyze the impact of GDPR on database systems. While there
have been a number of recent work analyzing GDPR from pri-
vacy and legal perspectives [34, 25, 47, 13, 44, 17, 45, 22, 27], the
database and systems communities are just beginning to get in-
volved. DatumDB [30] proposes an architectural vision for a database
that natively supports guaranteed deletion and consent manage-
ment. Compliance by construction [38] envisions new database
abstractions to support privacy rights. In contrast, we focus on
the challenges that existing DBMS face in complying with GDPR,
and design a benchmark to quantify its impact.
Orthogonal to our focus, researchers areworking on implement-
ing and analyzing individual GDPR articles end-to-end. For ex-
ample, Google researchers [15] have chronicled their experiences
implementing the Right to be Forgoen for their search service.
Two groups of researchers from Oxford University analyzed [24,
46] how GDPR’s right to explanation impacts the design of ma-
chine learning and articial intelligence systems. Finally, there is
a wealth of blog posts that describe how to achieve GDPR compli-
ance for popular storage systems including MongoDB [29], Cock-
roachDB [32], and Redis [12].
9. CONCLUSION
is work analyzes GDPR from a database systems perspective.
We discover the phenomenon of metadata explosion, identify new
workloads of GDPR, and design a new benchmark for quantify-
ing GDPR compliance. We nd that despite needing to implement
a modest number of changes to storage systems, GDPR compli-
ance results in signicant performance overheads. Our analyses
and experiments identify several implications for administering
GDPR-compliant database systems in the real world. We hope that
GDPRbench would be useful for customers, controllers, and regu-
lators in interpreting the compliance level of storage systems, and
helpful for database designers in understanding the compliance-
performance tradeo.
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